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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether successful litigants are required to include as
income for federal tax purposes the portion of settlements or awards that go to
their counsel for contingent attorney fees has been a thorny one for quite some
time.' The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) §104(a)(2) 2 excludes from gross
income the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)3 received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness. Accord-
ingly, the contingent legal fee issue arises only for claims that are not for
personal injury or sickness. The issue is relevant to all other claims that are
handled by attorneys on a contingent fee basis, for example employment dis-
crimination claims, wrongful termination claims, product liability claims,
securities claims, most punitive damage claims, and interest paid on claims
excluded under IRC §104(a)(2).
Seven of the Circuits consistently include contingency fees in a taxpayer's
gross income,4 while three Circuits5 exclude contingent legal fees from gross
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Note: In an effort to publish this article before the Supreme Court issues its decision in
Banaitis and its companion case, Banks v. Commissioner, legislation, cases, and scholarship
subsequent to October 1, 2004, have not been included. In particular, the Civil Rights Tax
Relief Act, contained within the American Jobs Creation Act, enacted on October 22, 2004,
has not been included. This new law provides an off-the-top deduction to taxpayers for the
costs of litigation for federal civil rights claims. The deduction is limited to the amount of
litigation for federal civil rights claims and to the amount of litigation income included in a
given tax year. While the Act may lend persuasive support to the petitioner's position in
Banks, it will not directly affect the outcome because the Act is not retroactive. The
provisions of the Act would not apply to the facts of Banaitis.
I See Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
2 Twenty-six United States Code sections are referred to in this note as the IRC sections.
I IRC § 104(c) provides: The phrase "(other than punitive damages)" shall not apply to
punitive damages awarded in a civil action - 104(c)(1) which is a wrongful death action, and
104(c)(2) with respect to which applicable State law (as in effect on September 13, 1995 and
without regard to any modification after such date) provides, or has been construed to pro-
vide by a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a decision issued on or before Septem-
ber 13, 1995, that only punitive damages may be awarded in such an action. This subsection
shall cease to apply to any civil action filed on or after the first date on which the applicable
State law ceases to provide (or is no longer construed to provide) the treatment described in
paragraph (2).
I Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d
107 (2nd Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3569; O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319
F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v.
BANAITIS V. COMMISSIONER
income. The Ninth Circuit has ruled in two cases for inclusion and in a recent
case Banaitis v. Commissioner6 for exclusion. In Banaitis, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court7 on the issue of requiring the inclusion in gross income
of the amount of contingent legal fees paid to Banaitis' attorneys and held that
an Oregon plaintiff may exclude the amount of contingent legal fees from gross
income for federal tax purposes. On March 29, 2004 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari at the government's request in Banaitis and
consolidated Banaitis with Banks v. Commissioner,8 a Sixth Circuit case
presenting the same issue. The single question presented is: whether, under
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 61(a), a taxpayer's gross
income from the proceeds of litigation includes the portion his damages recov-
ery that is paid to his attorneys pursuant to a contingent fee agreement.
Banaitis and Banks are representative of the minority approach in the Cir-
cuit Courts that the contingent legal fees may be excluded from gross income
for federal tax purposes under IRC §61(a). Two other fairly recent cases,9 ear-
lier than Banaitis, that followed the majority approach were denied certiorari
on taxpayer appeals; both Hukkanen-Campbell from the Tenth Circuit and
Benci-Woodward from the Ninth Circuit followed the majority of Circuits'
holding that the contingent legal fees were includable in a successful litigant's
gross income.
The argument date for Banaitis and Banks has been set for November 1,
2004. These cases have engendered a significant amount of interest in the legal
community that can be measured by the eleven amici curiae briefs filed to date
in Banaitis, while Banks has had twelve amici curiae briefs filed.o The major-
ity of these briefs are in support of the taxpayers and the organizations repre-
senting this support include the National Employment Lawyers Association, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., AARP, the Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, the Western Center on Law and Poverty," and the Equal
Employment Advisory Council.2
Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312
(10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
5 The Fifth Circuit excluded the contingent attorney's fees in Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d
119 (5th Cir. 1959) under Alabama law and more recently under Texas law in Srivastava v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854
(6th Cir. 2000), Banks v. Comm'r, 345 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003) (relying on Clarks),
cert.granted, 124 S.Ct. 1712 (2004); Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(same).
6 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 1712 (2004).
7 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1053 (2002).
8 345 F. 3d 373 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted 124 S.Ct. 1712 (2004).
9 Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001) cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1056 (2002); Benci-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1112 (2001).
1o Banaitis v. Comm'r, No. 03-907, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-907.htm
(last visited Sept. 18, 2004); Banks v. Comm'r, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/
03-892.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004).
11 2004 TNT 172-14 (Sept. 3, 2004).
12 2004 TNT 174-15 (Sept. 8, 2004).
Fall 2004]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
This note is structured as follows: In Part II a hypothetical illustration of
the two competing tax treatments to successful claimants is provided. Part III
examines the specific facts and legal rationales employed in the minority
approach in Banaitis (Ninth Circuit) and Banks (Sixth Circuit) and a brief
review of the cases best illustrating the majority approach. In Part IV there is a
review of the arguments and approaches that have been presented in briefs filed
by the petitioner and the respondents with the Supreme Court in Banaitis and
Banks. The conclusion is Part V.
II. ILLUSTRATION OF THE TWO COMPETING TAX TREATMENTS
To best understand the issue it is important to look at the differing federal
tax results for a successful litigant under the majority and minority positions.
For illustration purposes, the following assumptions are made: there is a total
$1 million settlement payment for employment discrimination, the litigant
receives $650,000 and the lawyers receive contingent legal fees of $350,000,
the litigant is single and would not normally itemize deductions, and the litigant
has a $70,000 per year salary with no other income. These assumptions are
purposefully simplistic, but keep the example tractable. 13 The legal fees are
assumed at a 35 percent rate to approximate the general total cost of litigations
of this type.
A. Tax treatment under the majority approach
Gross income $1,070,000
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 1,070,000
Itemized deductions:
(Attorney fees total $350,000)
Amount allowed as itemized deductions:14  300,781
Personal exemption-phased out -0-
Taxable income 769,219
Regular income tax' 5  250,134
Alternative minimum tax calculation:
Taxable income 769,219
Add back itemized deductions 300,781
Alternative minimum taxable income 1,070,000
Exemption amount (fully phased out) -0-
Alternative minimum tax base 1,070,000
13 The illustration calculations were performed using 2004 tax rates tables, phaseout limita-
tions, and standard deduction. Some writers have used an unrealistic example to illustrate the
possibility that the a successful claimant may be obligated to pay more in federal tax than the
amount she receives, see, for example, the amicus curiae brief of Kenneth Gideon, et al,
using nominal damages of $1 and attorneys fees of $275,000. This note uses a legal fee level
of 35% of the recovery to better illustrate a more realistic difference between the two
treatments.
14 The itemized deductions for attorneys fees is subject to a 2% of AGI floor, and there is an
overall limitation of itemized deductions applicable to higher income taxpayers: The amount
allowed is $350,000-((.02 x 1,070,000) + .03(1,070,000-142,700)) = $300,781.
15 $92,592.50 + .35(769,219-319,100) = $250,134.15
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Tentative minimum tax' 6  296,100
Minus regular income tax 250,134
Alternative minimum tax 45,966
Total Federal tax paid: $ 296,100
B. Tax treatment under the minority approach
Gross income $ 720,000
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 720,000
Less standard deduction 4,850
Personal exemption - phased out -0-
Taxable income 715,150
Regular income tax17  231,213
Alternative minimum tax calculation:
Taxable income 715,150
Add back standard deduction 4,850
Alternative minimum taxable income 720,000
Exemption amount (fully phased out) -0-
Alternative minimum tax base 720,000
Tentative minimum tax 18  208,100
Minus regular income tax 231,213
Alternative minimum tax -0-
Total Federal tax paid $ 231,213
C. Tax treatment without the settlement
Gross income $ 70,000
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 70,000
Less standard deduction 4,850
Personal exemption 3,100
Taxable income 62,050
Regular income tax19 10,750
Alternative minimum tax calculation not applicable
Total Federal tax paid $ 10,750
D. Comparison of the tax treatments
The best measure of the difference in taxes due is the difference between
the amount that would be due in federal taxes without the settlement and the
amount that would be due in federal taxes with the settlement. Under the major-
ity approach the taxpayer would owe $296,100 of federal tax incorporating the
settlement as opposed to $10,750 of federal tax without the settlement. The
16 Tentative minimum tax is 26% of the first $175,000 of income and 28% above $175,000,
or $296,100
17 $92,592.50 + .35(715,150-319,100) = $231,213.
1s Tentative minimum tax is 26% of the first $175,000 of income and 28% above $175,000,
or $208,100.
19 $4000 + .25(62,050-29,050) = $10,750
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difference in taxes owed would be $285,350. This difference accounts for about
44% of the net settlement amount received ($285,350/$650,000). Under the
minority approach the difference is $220,463 ($231,213 - 10,750) or approxi-
mately 34% of the net settlement proceeds. For this hypothetical, the net
amount of the proceeds remaining after legal fees and taxes is $353,900 (about
35% of the full settlement) under the majority view and $418,787 (about 42%)
under the minority view. The difference in federal taxes payable under the two
treatments incorporating the settlement is approximately $65,000. As the settle-
ment amounts grow, the difference in federal taxes required to be paid also
grows. The illustration used an individual earning a reasonable, but not overly
high, salary by today's standards. For many of the plaintiffs in wrongful termi-
nation or discrimination suits the proceeds received from an award or settle-
ment might represent a significant portion of their net worth and, consequently,
be of critical importance to their overall financial picture. However, it should
be recognized that a difference of 6.5%, although potentially important to the
prevailing claimant, is not really a tremendous difference in the scheme of the
federal tax laws.
The difference in federal income tax occurs due to the triggering of the
alternative minimum tax by the inclusion of legal fees in gross income. In the
minority view example an alternative minimum tax liability is not triggered.
The illustration of the claimant's tax position without the settlement serves to
provide the figures needed to show the effect of progressive tax rates and the
alternative minimum tax on the claimant's salary income. Instead of paying
federal taxes on his salary of approximately 15.4% ($10,750/$70,000), under
the majority treatment the percentage escalates to 27.7% ($70,000/$1,070,000
x $296,100 = $19,371/$70,000), an increase due to the progressive nature of
the tax rates. The illustration assumes that damages were received on account
of an employment discrimination claim and would, consequently, represent lost
wages. It is important to remember that even under the minority approach the
after-tax damages retained by the plaintiff represent only about 42% of the
wages lost.
The fact that the lost wages are realized in one period instead of over time
as they would have been earned coupled with the progressive nature of the
federal incomes rates results in the claimant being taxed at significantly higher
rates than would be case if the lost wages were realized over a normal time
frame. The tax situation of each successful claimant is different, but the funda-
mental result of the illustration that there is an additional federal tax burden
triggered under the majority approach holds true across the vast range of tax-
payers' individual situations.20 In rare circumstances, where the legal fees sig-
20 State tax implications have been excluded from the example, but as there is an income tax
in the vast majority of states and an alternative minimum tax in some states, there would
generally be a reduction in the amount of proceeds remaining to the taxpayer. The impact, if
any, of state alternative minimum tax on this issue is beyond the scope of this analysis. For
an excellent discussion of state alternative minimum taxes, see Yvonne L. Hinson & Ralph
B. Tower, State AMTfor Individuals: An analysis and Assessment, 32 STATE TAX NomEs
845 (June 14, 2004). Current tax laws generally treat each tax year as a separate economic
unit with taxpayers paying the rates on a single period of income. On an historical note, there
were at one time income-averaging provisions in IRC that would serve to tax a windfall in
one period over the average tax rates for a greater period of time. These provisions, no
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nificantly exceed the portion of the award retained by the claimant, the
additional taxes owed under the majority approach can exceed the portion of
the recovery that is retained by the claimant after taxes. 21 However, in the vast
majority of cases the attorneys fees are at the traditional 30 to 40% of the
recovery level and the level of additional taxes shown in the hypothetical illus-
tration provided above are representative of the levels successful claimants
would encounter.
III. BANAITiS AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND BANKS AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
AND THE MAJORITY APPROACH
A. Banaitis v. Commissioner
In Banaitis, the plaintiff Banaitis was employed as a banker by the Bank
of California specializing in export grain financing.22 Mitsubishi Bank also
was involved in the grain import/export financing business and then acquired
the Bank of California. Banaitis refused to give certain information regarding
his clients to Mitsubishi Bank officials at the request of his clients and in
accord with various confidentiality agreements entered into by Banaitis and the
Bank of California with these clients. Within months of his actions, Banaitis
received poor performance evaluations, was placed on work probation, and
began to have various physical maladies. His work situation became intolera-
ble and, after receiving a letter from the bank stating he had resigned and giv-
ing him one-half hour to clear out his desk, Banaitis left his position with the
Bank of California. He subsequently hired attorneys on a contingency fee
arrangement to bring an action for wrongful termination, and the resulting
physical and mental injuries. The action was successful, ultimately resulting in
a settlement with Mitsubishi Bank and the Bank of California for in excess of
$8 million with contingent legal fees in excess of $3.6 million.
Banaitis originally filed his tax return excluding the entire settlement from
gross income. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disagreed and issued a
notice of deficiency recalculating his liability including virtually the entire set-
tlement in gross income. Commonly, taxpayers attempt to exclude, from gross
income, the full settlements or awards as damages paid on account of personal
injury. Such attempts when discovered by the IRS invariably result in a notice
of deficiency. There is no way to know how many plaintiffs have incorrectly
characterized these amounts as excludable from gross income where the exclu-
sion is not discovered by the IRS. The contingent legal fee issue only arises in
those cases where the IRS uncovers either a taxpayer attempt to erroneously
exclude the settlement or a taxpayer attempt to exclude the legal fees where a
claim amount is included in gross income. Accordingly, it is impossible to
know how many taxpayers would be affected by the resolution of these cases.
longer in place, would have served to mitigate the problem of pushing taxpayers into signifi-
cantly higher rate brackets due to a windfall in a particular year.
21 See e.g., Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2002 at 18.
22 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (the facts cited in Part III.A can be found in the opinion).
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Banaitis filed a petition with the Tax Court seeking a review of the defi-
ciency. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the IRS on all points, including requir-
ing Banaitis to include the contingent legal fees in gross income under IRC §61
and requiring him to deduct the legal fees as expenses incurred for the produc-
tion of income under IRC §212. The legal fees were treated as itemized deduc-
tions for the production of income subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income
floor.23 However, these large itemized deductions that relate to attorney fees
are not allowable in calculating the taxpayer's alternative minimum taxable
income, the consequence of which is to trigger a significant alternative mini-
mum tax liability. The legal fees are treated under IRC §212 as are all other
expenses in connection with the production of income, none of which are
allowable as deductions in connection with the alternative minimum tax. On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the Tax Court on the issue of
inclusion of the legal fees, but upheld the Tax Court on the inclusion of most of
the remainder of the settlement.24
B. Ninth Circuit Decisions
Banaitis was the third case with respect to contingent legal fees that the
Ninth Circuit has decided. The two prior cases, Coady v. Commissioner
25
required an Alaska plaintiff to include the total settlement in income and Benci-
Woodward v. Commissioner26 required a California plaintiff to do the same. In
Coady, a wrongful termination claim was brought against Coady's employer
and, after a bench trial, Coady was awarded approximately $373,000, contin-
gent legal fees and court costs amounted to approximately $221,000.27 In
Benci-Woodward, the plaintiffs brought a series of claims arising out of an
employer investigation against the parent corporation of Target Stores, includ-
ing false imprisonment, defamation, and wrongful termination. A jury awarded
the plaintiffs in excess of $3 million in punitive damages, as well as compensa-
tory damages; the plaintiffs had entered into a 40% contingent fee agreement
with counsel.28
The Ninth Circuit in ruling on the three cases analyzed the nature under
state law of the attorneys' claim to the legal fees:
The question of whether attorneys fees paid under a contingent fee contract with a
plaintiff are includable in the plaintiffs gross income involves two related questions:
(1) how state law defines the attorney's rights in the action, and (2) how federal tax
law operates in light of this state law definition of interests. See United States v.
Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (noting that state law creates or defines the legal
interests and property rights but that federal law defines when and how these interests
and rights are taxed).29
23 Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 CB 51.
24 A small portion of the settlement was attributable to personal injuries and excludable
from income.
25 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
26 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001).
27 Coady, 213 F.3d at 1188.
28 T.C. Memo 1998-395.
29 Banaitis. 340 F.3d at 1081.
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The Ninth Circuit held in Coady and Benci- Woodward that there was no
superior property interest acquired by the attorneys under either Alaska or Cali-
fornia law and, consequently, the contingent legal fees represented gross
income to the plaintiffs.
The court in distinguishing Banaitis from its two prior decisions found
with respect to Oregon law:
In pertinent part, Oregon law is unlike the laws of California and Alaska. In pertinent
part, in fact, Oregon law mirrors Alabama law in that it affords attorneys generous
property interests in judgments and settlements. Unlike California and Alaska law, an
attorney's lien in Oregon is "superior to all other liens" except "tax liens." O.R.S.
§87.490. Under Oregon law, "a party to the action, suit or proceeding, or any other
person, does not have the right to satisfy the lien ... or any judgment, decree, order
or award entered in the action, suit or proceeding until the lien, and claim of the
attorney for fees based thereon, is satisfied in full."
3 0
In holding that the contingent fees in Banaitis were excluded from gross
income the Ninth Circuit found that Oregon law vested the attorney with a
sufficient property right in the settlement for the plaintiff not to be charged with
the gross income. 3' The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the reasoning in Cot-
nam v. Commissioner32 and the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Alabama law.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the "property rights" approach in its three decisions.
Essentially, the Banaitis holding relies strictly upon the interpretation that Ore-
gon state law vests the attorney with a greater property right or interest in the
legal fees than that of a mere service provider, or creditor of the plaintiff.
This property rights approach to exclude contingent legal fees from gross
income was first taken by a divided Fifth Circuit in Cotnam v. Commissioner.
That court decided that under Alabama laws an attorney has the same rights as
the client to the fees,33 and also that the granting of a interest in a contingent
legal fee was not an assignment of income under Lucas v. Earl,34 but rather the
assignment of a claim that was valueless at the time the assignment was
made.3' This view that there is no value to the claim at the time of entering
into the contingent fee arrangement becomes a critical component in the under-
lying rationale for the minority view cases in this area. It was not shared by the
entire Cotnam court, as Judge Wisdom in his dissent noted that the underlying
cause of action was for compensation for services rendered and the proceeds
were earned, just not paid, at the time of the granting of an interest to the
attorneys.36
30 Id. at 1082.
31 See Karl K. Marschel, It's a Property Issue: The Proper Treatment of Contingent Fees
Under the Federal Tax Code, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 323 (2003).
32 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
33 Id. at 125.
34 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
35 Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126. The court said "Mrs. Cotnam's tree had borne no fruit and
would have been barren if she had not transferred a part interest in that tree to her attorneys,
who then rendered the services necessary to bring forth the fruit." Id.
36 Id. at 126 (stating "Mrs. Cotnam sued the Hunter Estate and recovered on the theory that
she had a contract for compensation for services rendered. Thus, at the time of the assign-
ment to the attorneys all of her services had been rendered and all of the income earned").
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A more recent Fifth Circuit decision, Srivastava v. Commissioner,37
examined the rationale of Cotnam, and, for a Texas plaintiff, a divided court
held that the contingent legal fees were also excluded from gross income. The
court noted that, were they ruling anew, they might well have applied the antic-
ipatory assignment of income doctrine and included the contingent legal fees in
the claimant's gross income,3 8 but stated:
Rightly or wrongly, this court in Cotnam decided not to apply the anticipatory assign-
ment of income doctrine to contingent fee agreements .... In refusing the Commis-
sioner's request to distinguish Cotnam (as the Tax Court has grudgingly done on
occasion), we note that what the Commissioner truly seeks is a direct challenge to
Cotnam, in the Eleventh Circuit as well as here. We decline that invitation and,
instead, reverse the Tax Court's decision to include contingent fees within gross
income .... 39
Thus, the Fifth Circuit followed Cotnam while acknowledging the strength
of the anticipatory assignment of income argument. More importantly, the court
acknowledged the weakness of relying upon the state law attorney/client bundle
of rights argument. On the latter point the court noted:
We therefore agree with the Tax Court that, irrespective of whether it is proper to tax
contingent attorney's fees under the anticipatory assignment doctrine, the answer
does not depend on the intricacies of an attorney's bundle of rights against the oppos-
ing party under the law of the governing state.
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Coady, Benci-Woodward and Banaitis rely on
the state law bundle of rights argument; an argument of which the Fifth Circuit
currently is critical."0 Unlike the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has
not summarily rejected the property rights approach.4" It remains the only Cir-
cuit with split case decisions relying strictly on the state property rights
approach.
C. Banks v. Commissioner
The plaintiff in Banks was employed by the California Department of
Education as an educational consultant for fourteen years and was terminated.
Banks filed a federal employment discrimination claim, as well as state tort
claims for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress against his
former employer.42 Prior to trial, Banks abandoned his state tort claims and the
case proceeded to trial on the federal employment discrimination claim. Dur-
ing trial, a settlement was reached and Banks received $464,000. Banks
accepted a settlement that was lower than it otherwise would have been on his
belief that the damages would be excluded from his gross income for tax pur-
37 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
38 Id. at 363.
39 Id. at 364-365.
40 Chris Staton Spicer, Are Attorneys' Fees Income to the Taxpayer? The Inequitable and
Inconsistent Result of the Ninth Circuit's State Attorney Lien Law Approach in Banaitis v.
Commissioner, 57 TAx LAw REV. 845 (2004) (criticized the Ninth Circuit for following the
property rights approach and instead suggested that the Ninth Circuit should have used the
approach taken by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits).
41 Id. at 845 (suggesting the approaches in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit provide a fairer and
more consistent result).
42 Banks, 345 F.3d at 375.
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poses as damages on account of personal injuries or sickness. He paid
$150,000 of the settlement to his lawyers pursuant to a contingency fee agree-
ment. Banks excluded the entire settlement from his 1990 tax return taking the
position that all of the settlement proceeds related to personal injury damages
for injuries suffered subsequent to his termination. a3 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice filed a notice of deficiency, and Banks filed a petition with the Tax Court.
The Tax Court held that none of the settlement related to a personal injury and
the contingent legal fee was not excludable from gross income." Banks then
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
D. The Sixth Circuit's Decisions
In Banks, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the issue of whether
the settlement proceeds were excludable from gross income as damages relat-
ing to personal injury following Commissioner v. Schlier4 5 noting "First, the
taxpayer must have received the damages amount through the litigation of an
action (or a settlement thereof) based on tort or tort-type rights. Second, the
amount must be paid on account of personal injury or sickness." 6
Since the claim that was settled related to legal injuries under Title VII
and the sole remedy afforded was recovery of back wages, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the underlying claim was not sufficiently settled on account of
his personal injuries.47 Additionally, a divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed the
Tax Court and held that the contingent fees may be excluded from income.48
Banks sued under a California claim. In Benci-Woodward, discussed above, the
Ninth Circuit had held that under California law an attorney did not receive a
superior property right to the amount of contingent legal fees. Judge Moore in
her dissent noted this and would have ruled for the inclusion of the contingent
legal fee in income.49 The majority of the court adopted a different standard
from the underlying state property rights standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit.
The court in Banks relied heavily on a prior Sixth Circuit decision Estate of
Clarks v. United States 50 that had excluded contingent legal fees from gross
income for a Michigan claimant.
Estate of Clarks is the most far-reaching of the cases adopting the minor-
ity view. In Estate of Clarks the underlying claim was a personal injury claim
resulting from head injuries to Clark while he was unloading his truck at a K-
Mart. The damage award was $5.6 million and was excludable from gross
income as paid on account of personal injuries under IRC § 104(a)(2). However,
the interest on the award of approximately $5.7 million was not excludable
from gross income. The attorneys received one-third of both the damages and
the interest. The tax filing originally excluded the interest amount that was paid
43 Id. at 376.
44 T.C. Memo 2001-48 (there was also an issue as to the deduction of alimony to Banks'
former spouse, which is not relevant to this discussion).
45 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
46 Id. at 337.
47 Banks, 345 F.3d at 382.
48 Id. at 386.
49 Id. at 389.
50 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
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directly to the attorneys. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency and the estate
subsequently paid the extra taxes due on the interest and then sued in district
court for a refund. In the district court summary judgment was entered for the
government.51
In Estate of Clarks, the Sixth Circuit advocated a more radical approach
stating that the attorney-client relationship is akin to a joint venture:
In the instant case, as in Cotnam, the value of taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely specu-
lative and dependent on the services of counsel. The claim simply amounted to an
intangible, contingent expectancy. The only economic benefit Clarks could derive
from his claim against the defendant in state court was to use the contingent part of it
to help him collect the remainder. Like an interest in a partnership agreement or
joint venture, Clarks contracted for services and assigned his lawyer a one-third
interest in the venture in order that he might have a chance to recover the remaining
two-thirds. Just as in Cotnam, the assignment Clarks' lawyer received operated as a
lien on a portion of the judgment sought to be recovered transferring ownership of
that portion of the judgment to the attorney.52
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Lucas v. Earl and Helvering v. Horst5 3 by
noting that in those two cases the assignees were recipients of gifts with the
effect of the gifts to split income off to lower taxed family members not to a
person(s) who had to earn their share of the income. The court also noted that
under the government's theory both the plaintiff and attorney are taxable on the
income, but critically the attorney(s) must by his efforts earn his portion of the
proceeds.54 The Sixth Circuit reiterated this reasoning in Banks.
Estate of Clarks is particularly interesting because it introduces joint ven-
ture or partnership theory between the attorney and the client. This is a strong
acknowledgment that the economics of the attorney/client relationship in con-
tingent fee cases may be something more than the traditional service provider
arrangements, due to the risks assumed by the attorney and the significant level
of participation in the outcome that the attorney gains. Unlike the Ninth Circuit
that has relied on the traditional state property rights analysis and rationale, the
Sixth Circuit has introduced a more economically oriented and radical approach
to the contingent fee question. If the court had not adopted the broader
approach, then Banks, who was suing under a California claim and settled his
claim during trial in the federal district court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia55 would have, as the dissent noted, been constrained by the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Benci-Woodward. It is likely the Sixth Circuit's broader approach
in these cases and the Ninth Circuit's apparent change of direction in Banaitis
persuaded the Supreme Court that it is time to address the conflict on this split
that currently exists among the circuit courts.
51 Id. at 855.
52 Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
53 Lucas v. United States, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
54 Estate of Clarks, 202 F. 3d, at 857.
55 Banks, 345 F.3d, at 375.
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E. The Majority Approach
Seven of the Circuits that have ruled favor inclusion: the First,56 Second.57
Third, 58 Fourth, 59 Seventh, 60 Tenth, 6 ' and Federal 62 Circuits include contin-
gency fees in a taxpayer's gross income. The Circuits that have included con-
tingent legal fees in gross income have generally relied on the anti-assignment
logic of Helvering v. Horst and Lucas v. Earl. Strongly favoring inclusion, the
Second Circuit reversed the Vermont district court in Raymond v. United
States,6 3 and included the contingent legal fees in the plaintiff's gross income
and stated:
In sum, although the relative interests that attorney and client have in the contingent
fee portion of a judgment are relevant to the taxation of that fund, state-law concepts
of those interests must be read in the context of federal tax policies. We do not read
Vermont law as providing attorneys with a proprietary interest in their clients'
claims. Further, determining to whom income flows depends in large part upon who
controls the source of the income. When a taxpayer is in sufficient control of the
source of income, federal principles of taxation deem him the recipient of gross
income upon its disposition. This is such a case. And at least in this case, we believe
the result supports the primacy of substance over form. Raymond secured a judg-
ment. He paid his attorney. The form that payment took is immaterial.64
The Second Circuit attributed the income to the taxpayer and noted that
the fact that the taxpayer would be prevented from deducting the attorneys' fees
under the alternative minimum tax was unfortunate, but was not a sufficient
motivation to create a contingent fee exception where the taxpayer controls the
property, i.e., the claim. Its opinion is the most recent and contains perhaps the
best articulations of the majority view on this issue. Accordingly, a discussion
of Raymond and analysis of the issues can best provide a thorough understand-
ing of the majority position in these cases.
In Raymond, Raymond was employed by IBM and brought a wrongful
termination suit against IBM. He retained counsel on a one-third contingency
fee basis. At trial, Raymond was awarded a $900,000 judgment. IBM paid Ray-
mond $600,000, less $243,000 in federal tax withholding, and directly paid his
attorneys the remaining $300,000. Raymond originally filed his tax return
including the entire $900,000 of the judgment as his gross income and deducted
the legal fees as itemized deductions subject to the 2% of adjusted gross
income floor. On an amended tax return for the year, Raymond excluded the
$300,000 from his gross income that IBM had paid directly to his attorneys and
claimed a refund of approximately $55,000.65 The inclusion of the legal fees
56 Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
57 Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3rd 107 (2nd Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, No. 03-
1415.
58 O'Brien v. Comm'r, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963).
59 Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
60 Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
61 Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1056 (2002)
62 Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
63 Raymond, 355 F.3d 107.
64 Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 108-109.
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on the original return as income and then deducted as itemized deductions trig-
gered the alternative minimum tax, as discussed above, and resulted in the addi-
tional tax liability that he now claimed as a refund. The IRS denied Raymond's
refund claim and he filed suit in district court to recover the refund claimed.6 6
The district court granted Raymond's motion for summary judgment holding
that under Vermont law the agreement between and his attorney gave rise to an
equitable lien in favor of the attorney and that Raymond did not have a suffi-
cient interest in the amount paid to the attorneys to give rise to income to
Raymond.67 The government appealed to the Second Circuit.
It is interesting to speculate whether this litigation would have occurred
had Raymond not included the entire judgment on his initial tax filing. The
document sent by IBM to Raymond and IRS likely included as gross income
only the $600,000 that IBM paid to Raymond, as most corporate tax reporting
systems are set to capture the payment amounts to payees rather than an
inflated figure. IBM would have received, if allowable, a tax deduction of
$900,000 in either scenario.6 ' The opinion does not indicate how Raymond
made the decision to include the entire judgment in the first instance. In any
event, Raymond did choose to include the entire amount and the case pro-
ceeded up to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit reviewed the case, noting that the general approach
taken by the various circuits has been to apply a state law analysis to determine
the level of relative property interest between the attorneys and the litigant in
the amount of the contingent legal fees.69 The Court stated that courts that
have found the attorney's interest to be sufficiently strong have excluded the
contingent legal fees from the gross income of the litigant - a minority of
courts -while the courts that have found the property interest of the attorney in
the claim to be more in the nature of a security interest have included the
amount of the contingent legal fees in the gross income of the litigant - a
majority of the courts.7 ° In this regard, the Second Circuit characterized the
apparent "circuit split" as perhaps not a true split on the law. 71 The Court cited
Young and Banks as cases that have taken a federal, rather than state law,
approach to the issue, noting that the Fourth Circuit in Young indicated that the
issue should be resolved as one of federal tax law and not by trying to ferret out
the level of property interest the attorney and the claimant share in the underly-
ing cause of action. The Second Circuit indicated that in Banks the contingent
fee agreement was governed by California law and the Sixth Circuit departed
from Benci-Woodward and that its departure was on federal grounds. 72 As
discussed above, the Sixth Circuit in Banks may have decided on federal
grounds, but it is also likely that its belief that there is more to the relationship
of attorney-client, i.e., that the attorney client relationship is akin to a joint
66 Id. at 109.
67 Raymond v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 2d 548 (D. Vt. 2002).
68 See Wood, Daher, and Wood, Attorney's Fees: Maverick Circuit Says 'Oregon Good,
Calif. Bad', 101 TAx NoTEs 91, 92 (Oct. 6, 2003) (discussion of whether the attorneys fee
are paid directly to the attorney by the defendant or paid by the claimant matters.)






venture in contingency fee cases, as indicated in Estate of Clarks and reiterated
in Banks likely played an important role in their decision.
The Second Circuit's analysis of the law started with the broad interpreta-
tion that has been given to IRC §61(a) that defines "gross income" as "all
income from whatever source derived." The Court noted that the Supreme
Court has given this provision a broad construction "to tax all gains except
those specifically excluded."73 However, a gain is not taxed until the benefit of
it is realized. Additionally, the gain itself need not actually go to the taxpayer, it
is only required that the taxpayer receives the benefit of a gain. Beyond the
direct realization of the benefit, the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine
prohibits a taxpayer from moving the realization of the benefit a gain from
herself to another party.7 4 The impact of this rule is that retaining control of
property is retaining the income from the property. To effectively divest oneself
of the income requires one to effectively divest the underlying property from
which the income is derived.
This impact can be seen in Helvering v. Horst. In Horst, a father retained
ownership of bonds while making a gift of the coupons to his son. The
Supreme Court held that the income, i.e. the interest derived from the coupons,
was properly taxed to the father. Applying the logic of Horst in Raymond,
the Second Circuit determined that although the attorney may have a lien on
the proceeds of the claim it is not the same as having a proprietary interest in
the claim itself.
7 6
Commentators have also supported the Second Circuit's reasoning. Mar-
schel 77 states:
In reality, the client owns the entire claim; it is the client's property. While an attor-
ney may have significant control over the prosecution of the claim, the claim is still
the property of the client. The contingent fee contract simply provides a device by
which the client pays for the attorney's labor with a portion of the client's future
recovery. The client receives the benefit of the attorney's services and, therefore, the
income represented by those services. To rule otherwise would be to create an artifi-
cial judicial exception to the statutory rules set forth by Congress in the Code.7 8
The Seventh Circuit in Kenseth v. Commissioner79 also aptly articulated
the argument and in criticizing Cotnam stated:
Enough; for in any event it is not a feasible judicial undertaking to achieve global
equity in taxation, see Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, supra, 219 F.3d at 944,
and cases cited there, especially when the means suggested for eliminating one ineq-
uity (that which Kenseth argues is created by the alternative minimum income tax)
consists of creating another inequity (differential treatment for purposes of that tax of
fixed and contingent legal fees). And if it were a feasible judicial undertaking, it still
would not be a proper one, equity in taxation being a political rather than a jural
73 Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
7' This doctrine comes from a pair of anti-assignment cases; See Lucas v. Earl 281 U.S. 111
(1930) and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
75 Horst, 311 U.S. at 120.
76 Raymond, 355 F.3d at 115.
77 Karl L. Marschel, It's a Property Issue: The Proper Treatment of Contingent Fees Under
the Federal Tax Code, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 323 (2003).
78 Id. at 349.
79 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
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concept. Indeed the cases that reject the Tax Court's position seem based on little
more than sympathy for taxpayers. The granddaddy of those cases, Cotnam v. Com-
missioner, supra, a 2-1 opinion (so far as relates to the issue in our case) with Judge
Wisdom dissenting, states its rationale as follows: "The amount of the contingent fee
was earned, and well earned, by the attorneys. True, in a remote rather than a proxi-
mate sense, the entire amount of the judgment had also been earned by Mrs. Cotnam,
but she could never have collected anything or have enjoyed any economic benefit
unless she had employed attorneys, and to do so, she had to part with forty per cent
of her claim long before the realization of any income from it." 263 F.2d at 126. This
rationale badly flunks the test of neutral principles. It is often the case that to obtain
income from an asset one must hire a skilled agent and pay him up front; that
expense is a deductible expense, not an exclusion from income.
80
The last thought in the above quote from the Seventh Circuit opinion in
Kenseth seems a bit off the mark. One must frequently obtain skilled services,
to obtain income from an asset, but whether the payment is up front or in
arrears seems irrelevant to the question of whether contingent legal fees should
be included the claimant's gross income. The facts in Kenseth involved an age-
discrimination suit against an employer and a 40% contingency fee agreement.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion noted that there is "nothing exotic about this
analysis"8 and rejected all of the taxpayer's arguments, holding there was no
transfer of ownership of the claim, that the inability to fully deduct the legal
fees against income is irrelevant, and that a contingency fee arrangement
doesn't differ from an hourly fee arrangement in any material way.
The majority approach applies the existing legal precedents in a logical
and straightforward manner. The crux of these applications is that it is the client
who controls the claim from the onset to the disposition or dissipation of the
claim. Only the client has the decisional authority to compromise or abandon
the claim and at any time the client may dismiss counsel and retain another,
albeit potentially at some cost. The attorney merely provides the services
needed to facilitate the client's realization, if any, of value for the underlying
claim. This precept coupled with the anti-assignment rulings and the very broad
inclusion of income under IRC §61(a) provides a strong legal foundation for
the majority view in these cases.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS INCLUDED IN BRIEFS TO THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Government's Case
The government's case is clearly the easier and more straightforward of
the two presentations and is included in a joint brief that was filed for Banaitis
and Banks. 82 The government's principal argument is that the taxation of these
amounts is a question of federal law and that IRC §61(a) includes the entire
award or settlement in gross income, since there is no specific statutory exclu-
sion for the type of damages received by the taxpayers in either Banaitis or
80 Id. at 885.
81 Id. at 884.
82 Brief for Petitoner, Banaitis, at http://www.lawmemo.com/emp/docs/us/banks-brpet.pdf
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
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Banks.8 3 The second argument made by the government is that, even if state
law were to apply, that - under California law, as to Banks, or Oregon law, as
to Banaitis - the law would still require the inclusion of the full settlement
proceeds in federal income for tax purposes.84
Fundamentally, the government relies on the language of IRC §61(a) that
provides "except as provided in this subtitle, gross income includes all income
from whatever source derived," and past Supreme Court decisions giving a
broad interpretation to the statute, including Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass,
where the Court held that it was the "the intention of Congress to tax all gains
except those specifically excluded.""5 Thus, the first prong of the govern-
ment's main argument is simply that the full amount of the settlements is
income under IRC § 61(a).
The next prong to the government's inclusion argument is that the income
is earned by the successful claimants and cannot through assignment be moved
to another taxpayer. In this regard the government cites the cases giving rise to
the judicial "assignment-of-income doctrine" that provides that a taxpayer is
taxed on income attributable to him and cannot move the income to another
through anticipatory assignment.8 6 The government states that "[tihe assign-
ment-of-income doctrine is a practical necessity in a system of graduated taxa-
tion; without it, a taxpayer in a high tax bracket could avoid heightened levels
of taxation simply by shifting income to a lower-bracket taxpayer. '"87 The gov-
ernment also includes a citation to Lucas v. Earl88 to emphasize that the tax-
payer's motives have been held to be irrelevant in the question of assignment,
indicating that a motives test would be judicially intractable and subject to
abuse. 89 The government then cites the various Circuit Court decisions that
have held the contingent legal fees are included in the gross income of the
taxpayer,9" including excerpts from the decisions in Raymond and Kenseth that
are discussed in Section III.E above.
In light of the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Banks, the government argues that
the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the assignment-of-income doctrine does not
apply to contingent legal fee cases is erroneous. The government lists four fac-
tors that the Sixth Circuit used to justify its holding that the contingent legal
fees are not income to the claimant: that the plaintiffs claim is a contingent
expectancy at the time the contingent fee agreement is made; that the nature of
the relationship of attorney client is like a partnership or joint venture; that
there is no tax-avoidance purpose, or motive, for the transaction; and that there
would be double taxation if the contingent legal fees are included in the claim-
ant's income.91
83 Id. at 14.
84 Id. at 35.
85 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1995). The government also relies on Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S.
323 (1995) and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
86 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111(1930); Helvering v. Horst 311 U.S. 112(1940).
87 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 82, at 20.
88 281 U.S. at 115.
89 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 82, at 20.
90 See cases cited supra note 4.
91 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 82, at 26.
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With respect to the claim being a contingent expectancy, the government
notes that Earl dealt with the anticipatory assignment of income, or income not
yet earned. Regarding the partnership or joint venture factor, the government
argues that there was no authority cited by the Sixth Circuit for this notion and
that under state law there is only a secured claim at best for the attorney in the
ultimate amount of any damages. The argument made here is that the control of
the property right in the claim is never relinquished by the client and the attor-
ney is, no matter how dependent on the outcome for his compensation, merely
an instrument in effectuating the realization of income from property owned
and controlled by. another. Consequently, as the assignment-of-income cases
have held the income simply belongs to the owner of the property. The third
element of the Sixth Circuits' reasoning, that there is no tax-avoidance purpose,
is countered with the argument that what the Sixth Circuit is doing is incor-
rectly attempting to introduce a motives inquiry in violation of the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Earl.92 Finally, as to the double taxation
notion the government argues that the Sixth Circuit is incorrect and that double
taxation is a common occurrence under the tax code pointing out that any time
a taxpayer purchases goods or services that are non-deductible there is tax on
both parties to the transaction.93
The government's second argument addresses the decisions in the Fifth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that relied upon provisions in state law in deciding
to exclude the contingent legal fees from the gross income of the successful
claimant. Although the government contends these decisions are in error as the
question is governed by federal law, they do argue that the respective state
statutes, California for Banks, and Oregon for Banaitis, do not give the attorney
an interest in the property but rather no more than a security interest in the
proceeds in the claim. Consequently, the relationship is no more than that of a
debtor-creditor and not joint owners of the property. In making this argument
the government cites and discusses the respective state statutes and decisions,
including the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in Benci-Woodward that concluded
a California plaintiff should include the total damages in gross income. The
government argues that the decision in Banaitis was incorrect as to the interpre-
tation of Oregon law by the Ninth Circuit. With respect to Banks, the govern-
ment argues that Benci-Woodward's interpretation of California law should
control and that the decision in Banks was in error even on state law grounds.
This is a restatement of the dissenting argument in Banks. Additionally, the
government noted that the Sixth Circuit in Banks did not take issue with the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California law.94
B. The Taxpayer's Case in Banks
There are five arguments made in the taxpayer's brief in Banks. These
arguments are: there is no provision of the IRC that requires the taxpayer to
recognize income properly allocable to his attorney; the contingent legal fee
cannot be income to the taxpayer, as the taxpayer did not have the requisite
92 Id. at 33.
93 Id. at 34.
94 Id. at 35-41.
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dominion or control over that portion of the recovery; the contingent fee part of
the settlement could have been awarded under fee-shifting statutes and is there-
fore income only to the attorney; the government's position is unjust and can
lead to the payment of more in taxes than the amount of a recovery; and the
assignment-of-income doctrine does not apply to a contingent fee contract. 95
Each of these arguments presumes that federal law controls the disposition of
the case. In Banks there is no argument made that it is a matter of state law that
should control the case. The taxpayer's arguments are at times far more interre-
lated than the government's arguments.
The taxpayer's initial argument is that since IRC §61(a) does not specifi-
cally state that the contingent fee is income to the taxpayer that the decision as
to whether it is income must come from a judicial interpretation of what is
income. Without enumerating specific citations the taxpayer argues that "the
Court's decisions have made clear that control or power of disposition of an
item of receipt is a prerequisite to charging a taxpayer with income."9 6 This
essentially collapses the first argument into the second argument that the tax-
payer lacked sufficient dominion, control, and beneficial ownership over the
portion of the recovery that went to the attorneys.
In this regard the taxpayer relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen for the con-
trol test quoting "The crucial question remains whether the assignor retains
sufficient power and control over the assigned property or over receipt of the
income to make it reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the income for tax
purposes."97 The brief also cites Carliss v. Bowers,9 8 stating that "The income
that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him. . . "The taxpayer's argument on this point is
that the entering of a contingent fee arrangement is an action through which the
taxpayer ceded sufficient control over the portion of any claim that was realized
to his attorney so that it would be inappropriate to charge him with income for
the portion of the damages retained by the attorney. This leads to the taxpayer
embracing the joint venture or partnership theory that was enumerated by the
Sixth Circuit in Estate of Clarks, discussed in Section III.D above, as this inter-
pretation of the attorney-client relationship in contingent fee cases supports the
lack of sufficient control argument for the charging of income to the taxpayer
on the contingent legal fees. •
The third and perhaps, the most interesting argument made for the tax-
payer relates to the fact that the underlying causes of action that were ulti-
mately settled in Banks related to discrimination claims under federal statutes.
This is because the state tort claims initially alleged in the litigation were ulti-
mately dropped. Under each of these federal statutes99 there are fee-shifting
provisions that enable a court to award attorneys' fees to successful litigants.
The taxpayer's argument here is that there should be no difference between the
tax treatment afforded those who settle claims including amounts that are for
attorneys' fees and those who successfully prosecute their claims and the court
9 Brief for Respondent, Banks (No. 03-892).
96 Id. at 10.
9' Id. ( citing Sunnen, 331 U.S. 591, 604 (1948)).
98 Id. (citing Carliss, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930)).
99 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).
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awards attorneys' fees." ° The thrust of this argument is that charging Banks
with income relating to the portion of the settlement that went to his attorneys
would punish him and future litigants under discrimination statutes, thus under-
mining the discrimination statutes.
The fourth argument made for the taxpayer is that the application of the
anti-assignment rules to these legal fee cases can result in an unjust and unduly
harsh result for claimants in that the taxes owed can exceed the net amount of
the award received by the claimant. To illustrate this outcome the brief uses the
case of Cynthia Spina1' who received an award of $300,000, attorneys' fees of
$850,000 and costs of $100,000. The ultimate tax bill, due to the inclusion of
the attorneys' fees in her income, for the claimant was about $99,000 more than
the $300,000 she received as her share of the award. This unusual outcome is
only possible if the attorneys' fees are substantially in excess of the portion of
the award that goes to the claimant. The illustration in section II above is more
reflective of the actual outcomes for the claimant in these cases.
The final argument made by the taxpayers is that the assignment-of-
income doctrine should not be applicable to the contingent legal fee situation.
Here the taxpayer sets forth a series of reasons why this doctrine should not
apply. Initially, the contingent legal fee situation as an arms-length arrangement
differs from the intra-family assignments in Earl and Horst that are the founda-
tion anti-assignment cases.1 °2 The taxpayer also argues that the motivation for
entering the contingent fee contract was not to avoid taxes or to shift income to
a lower bracket taxpayer.10 3 The assignment-of-income doctrine does not
apply to cases where the transfer of an interest is in a speculative litigation at
the time of transfer. Here, the taxpayer, based on language in Private Letter
Ruling 200427009, July 2, 2004, argues that where a claim is doubtful or con-
tingent at the time of transfer no inclusion of income is required at the time.' 4
The taxpayer also argues that absent clear Congressional intent that double tax-
ation is to be avoided, and there is no authority for the IRS to tax this situation
twice. 0 5 Finally, the taxpayer argues that there is a significant difference in
the economic relationship between an hourly or fixed fee attorney-client rela-
tionship and a contingent attorney-client relationship. This last argument bol-
sters the joint endeavor theory expounded by the Sixth Circuit and the lack of
sufficient control of the property argument discussed above.
C. The Taxpayer's Case in Banaitis
The respondent's brief in Banaitis 16 advances five main arguments on the
taxpayer's behalf. The initial two arguments advance a partnership theory
between the attorney and the client essentially adopting the Sixth Circuit's
broad joint venture approach in Estate of Clarks. The third argument is that the
assignment-of income doctrine is inapplicable. The fourth argument is that
10o Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 19.
101 Id. at 21; Liptak, supra note 21.
102 Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 23.
103 Id. at 28.
104 Id. at 32.
105 Id. at 35.
106 Brief for Respondent, Banaitis (No. 03-907).
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under Oregon law the attorney owned a portion of the cause of action, while the
final argument deals with the adverse consequences of a reversal of the Ninth
Circuit's decision.
The taxpayer's partnership argument asserts that the case should be gov-
erned by Subchapter K of the IRC. This subchapter governs the tax treatment of
numerous unincorporated entities, including partnerships and joint ventures.' °7
The taxpayer's argument is that the relationship between Banaitis and his attor-
neys constituted an entity covered by Subchapter K and as such an entity each
member should be taxed as provided for in the contingency fee agreement
between the parties under IRC § 704(a). Essentially, the taxpayer is saying that
the entire amount of damages constitutes gross income for the venture under
IRC §61(a) and that each participant is appropriately taxed on his distributive
share under IRC §61(a) (13). The argument asserts that the venture is created
by the taxpayer contributing his claim, to cover the out-of-pocket costs, and to
provide assistance in pressing the claim, while the attorney was obligated to do
all the legal work and to absorb his overhead costs. 10 8 These contributions and
efforts were directed to convert the cause of action against the taxpayer's for-
mer employer into a collectible judgment with the financial relationship
between the parties governed by the contingency fee agreement.10 9 The second
part of this partnership argument is that the cause of action was contributed to
the venture and that it is inappropriate to attribute all of the income realized to
the taxpayer when the taxpayer and the attorney had an agreement specifying a
differing distribution of the profits of the venture. A cause of action is like any
other kind of property that may be contributed to a venture which would then
be governed by the partnership rules under Subchapter K."'
The next argument made by the taxpayer is that the assignment-of-income
doctrine is inapplicable in this case. Here the arguments against applying the
doctrine are that there is no gratuitous assignment as in Earl and Horst. The
assignments in those two cases were to family members lacking any business
purpose, the income in those two cases was not speculative, but rather certain
to be earned, the property was retained by the assignor in those cases rather
than a portion of the property transferred, and finally, in those two cases the
income was ultimately taxed to the assignors not to both the assignors and
assignees."' Some of these arguments closely resemble those made by the
taxpayer in Banks discussed above.
The taxpayer also argues that under Oregon law the attorney owned a por-
tion of the cause of action and that since the attorney is a vested co-owner of
the cause of action the total damages should not be taxed to the respondent."'
Under Oregon's lien law, the lien not only attaches to the proceeds of the
107 IRC §761(a) (2004) (provides in pertinent part that for purposes of this subtitle, the term
"partnership" includes a syndicate, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization
through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and
which is not, within the meaning of this title, a corporation or trust or estate).
108 Brief for Respondent, supra note 106, at 6.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 11-13.
111 Id. at 13-18.
112 Id. at 18-24.
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action, but to the action itself. In support of this argument the taxpayer cites
Potter v. Schlesser 11 3 a case in which a defendant was successfully sued by an
attorney for fees after the client settled the case without paying or informing his
attorney, even though the defendant had paid the full settlement to the client.
The taxpayer's argument here differs from the joint venture, or Subchapter K
argument, as this argument asserts that under Oregon law the taxpayer had
effectively assigned a portion of the claim so he cannot be taxed on the whole
of the damages.
The taxpayer's final argument includes a series of deleterious effects that
might occur if the case is reversed. These effects include the double taxation of
both the prevailing claimant and the attorney, the potential negative effect on
fee-shifting agreements under both federal and state law, the potential for a
prevailing defendant to have to pay tax on fees paid to his attorneys, the effect
on class action attorney fees, and taxing the successful claimant on fees
awarded to pro bono attorneys by the court where the claimant had no obliga-
tion to pay fees." 4
V. CONCLUSION
Banaitis and Banks were consolidated at the Supreme Court because they
present the sole question of whether the contingent legal fees of successful
claimants should be included in the claimants' gross income under IRC §61(a)
for federal income tax purposes. These cases may be joined by Raymond, the
Second Circuit case following the majority approach, discussed in section III.E.
This question of what is gross income continues to be a thorny one in our tax
system. Further, the specific question of whether contingent legal fees are
gross income has been addressed in many of the circuit courts. The over-
whelming majority of the circuits have determined that the contingent legal
fees are indeed gross income under IRC §61(a). to the winners of awards or
settlements and that the legal fees are itemized deductions under IRC §212.
This is true despite the fact that, for the alternative minimum tax, these deduc-
tions are disallowed and the tax bill escalates in a disproportionate manner,
possibly eroding all of the benefit of having won an award or settlement.'
1 5
There is no doubt that on paper the government has the stronger case to present;
most of the precedents lean in their favor and the few that do not are, in some
cases, weak split decisions. In Srivastava, after touting the majority opinion as
more sound, the court followed the minority as a matter of stare decisis. There
are, however, some novel arguments in the briefs filed by the taxpayers or
amici curiae that require examination.
The argument that the statutes under which the claim arose provides for
fee-shifting may be the most interesting. The taxpayer's reasoning is that a
portion of any settlement must logically include some amount for legal fees and
that if the legal fees were awarded by the court directly to the attorneys rather
than included in the settlement the legal fees would only be taxed to the attor-
neys as the legal fees are separate from the cause of action at trial. This argu-
113 Id. (citing Potter v. Schlesser, 63 P.3d 1172 (Or. 2003)).
114 Id. at 24-28.
115 See Liptak, supra note 21.
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ment was adopted by Porter v. United States Agency for International
Development. 116 If the award of attorneys' fees under discrimination statutes is
a separate item from the cause of action, then it would appear to be unreasona-
ble to attempt to tax those fees to the prevailing plaintiff.'17 This argument is
limited to those claimants under federal discrimination statutes that contain fee-
shifting provisions, such as the claimant in Banks, but it is a new argument in
these contingent fee cases. The amici curiae briefs of The National Employ-
ment Lawyers Association, et al., and The Equal Employment Advisory Coun-
cil strenuously support this argument. The claimant in Banaitis recovered under
state claims rather then federal discrimination claims, so this argument would
not be available to Banaitis, although it is included in the taxpayers brief in the
list of potential adverse effects that would occur if the Ninth Circuit is reversed.
As noted in section IV.C, under subchapter K of the IRC, the arrangement
between the attorney and the taxpayer qualifies as a partnership under the IRC.
There is some question that even if this argument is accepted by the Supreme
Court that the result would be in taxpayers favor. Professor Polsky has written a
well reasoned analysis of this argument concluding that the result would go
against the taxpayer,' 8 and has also filed an amicus curiae brief to this
effect.1 19 Essentially, Polsky's argument is that under IRC §83 the attorneys
interest is a capital interest with vesting held in abeyance until the resolution of
the claim and that when the attorney's interest vests it is equivalent to an inter-
est in exchange for past services triggering both a full gain and then a deduction
of the legal fees for the taxpayer/partner. This result would leave the taxpayer
in the same place as the majority approach, and not surprisingly, the amicus
brief was filed in support of the government.
On the other side of the issue, Professor Davenport in his scholarship
120
and in his amicus curiae brief, 12 ' argues that all legal fees should be treated as
transaction costs and recovered from the gross amount of the claim before the
recognition of income under IRC §61 (a). This results in only the net amount of
the damages, after attorneys' fees, being reported as gross income, i.e., the
minority approach result, but achieves this result without embracing the reason-
ing to date in the minority approach cases. To adopt this view one must view
the disposition of the legal claim as falling under IRC §61(a) (3) as a gain from
the dealing in property. There has been only minor acceptance of this approach
in the circuit courts 2 2 and neither of the respondents' briefs presents this argu-
ment. However, the argument provides an interesting possible alternative to the
approaches taken to date.
116 293 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D. D.C. 2003).
117 See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982).
11 Greg D. Polsky, Contingent Fees: Why The Partnership Theory Doesn't Work, 104 TAX
NOTES 1089 (Sept. 6, 2004); Greg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of
Contingent Attorney's Fees: Enough With the Fruit and The Trees, 37 G.A. L. REV. 57
(2002).
119 Amicus Curiae Brief of Greg D. Polsky & Hellwig, Banaitis (No. 03-097).
120 Charles Davenport, Why Tort Legal Fees Are Not Deductible, 97 TAX NOTES 703 (Nov.
4, 2002).
121 Amicus Curiae Brief of Charles Davenport, Banaitis (No. 03-907).
122 Davenport, supra note 120, at 704.
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Overall, despite the number of amici briefs supporting the taxpayer's posi-
tion, the government's case is the clear favorite in this conflict. Nonetheless,
for many of these claimants their awards or settlements might represent signifi-
cant portions of their net worth. In Banaitis, the plaintiff was a successful
banker fired for adhering to a confidentiality agreement he and his employer
had signed before a corporate takeover by a Japanese bank. In Banks, the plain-
tiff was a fourteen year veteran employee in education that suffered employ-
ment discrimination and accepted a lower settlement on the erroneous belief
that whole of the damages, not just the legal fees, would be excluded from
gross income and, therefore, not subject to federal income tax.
As emphasized in the respondents' briefs, there is also a significant dis-
tinction between the tax consequences in these cases and the tax consequences
in the anti-assignment cases. In those cases, there was an attempted shift from
taxpayers in a higher tax bracket to taxpayers in a lower tax bracket and the
government would not be getting the appropriate tax rate on the income.
123
Here, since for any sizable settlement, the alternative minimum tax effectively
negates most of the value of the tax deduction of the legal fees, the government
is collecting some additional income tax that is probably unwarranted. It is true
that the itemized deductions are treated the same for all taxpayers and that it is
within Congress' legislative prerogative to tax income twice. 124 In these cases,
however, the double taxation is likely an unintended consequence of the alter-
native minimum tax scheme, rather than an intentional decision to assess addi-
tional tax to taxpayers in this situation. Contingent legal fees in their scope,
amount and frequency are likely far more significant then most other items
allowed as deductions under IRC §212 for the production of income.
If the Supreme Court takes a broader view of the situation than the gov-
ernment is advocating, it may be the tax treatment under the fee-shifting provi-
sions associated with the federal discrimination statutes that may serve to
persuade the Court that justice is better served by departing from the more
traditional legal analysis. There is also the possibility that although the question
presented in the two cases is the same that the court will find that contingent
legal fees are generally includable in gross income, but that the fees in one of
the respondent's situation is subject to a particular exemption. This could occur
if the Supreme Court views the Banks federal discrimination fee-shifting argu-
ment favorably, while failing to see merit in the arguments advanced in
Banaitis.
Finally, to look back at the question posed by the title of this note, will the
Ninth Circuit be reversed in Banaitis, a careful reading of the IRC, the earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court in the anti-assignment cases, and the majority
of the circuit court opinions would indicate an answer in the affirmative. The
difference in the taxes owed, illustrated in section II, also shows that the added
tax burden, although real, may not be as significant in the vast majority of cases
as proponents of the minority approach would have one believe. An inclusion-
123 If one considers state and local income taxes that frequently are calculated starting from
federal income, the problem in high-tax states would be even greater.
124 For example, the double taxation of dividend income to individuals and corporations that
was somewhat mitigated by recent tax law changes reduces the maximum tax on dividends
to the capital gain tax rates.
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ary decision by the Supreme Court would provide the simplest way to ensure
uniformity throughout the country in the tax treatment afforded contingent legal
fees. Given the nature and prevalence of contingency fee arrangements in our
legal system and the likelihood that contingency fees arrangements will con-
tinue to be utilized to provide access to the system to those who otherwise
might be excluded from seeking justice, receiving a ruling from the Court that
provides certainty and uniformity as to the tax treatment of contingent legal
fees for claimants will be, irrespective of which side of the issue the Court
comes down on, quite welcome. The arguments advanced by both sides of this
controversy are interesting and well-reasoned and have engendered significant
interest in the practice and academic arenas of the legal provision. Finally, the
ultimate arbiter in tax cases is Congress and a ruling from the Court that proves
unpopular may stir Congressional action on the issue.125 In the meantime, the
interest in the questions posed by Banaitis is likely to result in a significant
number of comments and articles.
125 See Richard E. Sympson, Taxation of Contingent Legal Fees on Settlements or Awards,
3 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 170 (2003) (concluding the majority approach is unfair and sug-
gesting the appropriate resolution is a change in the AMT rules).
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